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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and PAUL T. KIRBY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 930374-CA 
Priority 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PAUL T. KIRBY 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent Paul T. Kirby ("Kirby") concurs with Petitioner's 
Statement of Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUES 
1. Kirby adopts by reference the portions of the Brief of 
the Respondent Industrial Commissioner of Utah ("the Industrial 
Commission") which concern Issue One, to wit: Whether the January 
22, 1993 Determination and Order issued by the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division ("UADD") is invalid because it was not 
signed by Anna Jensen. 
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2. Kirby does not concur with Petitioner Salt Lake Community 
College's ("the College") statement of the issues on review. 
Properly, the issues on review are as follows: 
a. Whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion 
when it failed to grant an extension to the College to file 
its Request for an Evidentiary Hearing ("Request"). 
b. Whether, absent a good cause showing, the Industrial 
Commission had jurisdiction to grant a review of its 
Determination and Order since the Request was received by the 
Industrial Commission more than thirty days after it issued 
its Determination and Order. 
c. Whether it was error for the Administrative Law Judge 
("ALJ") to issue his decision that the College's Request 
untimely before the College replied to Kirby's Motion to 
Strike, 
d. If it was error for the ALJ to issue his decision that 
the College's Request was untimely, whether that error was 
harmless. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Kirby adopts by reference the portions of the Industrial 
Commission's Brief which concern Issue One. 
With respect to Issue Two, subparagraphs (a) (b) and (c) 
should be reviewed under Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(iv), which provides that the appellate court can grant 
relief if the agency action is arbitrary or capricious, and the 
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court employs the reasonableness standard. Maverick Country Stores 
v. The Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993). 
Subparagraph (d) should be reviewed to determine whether, even 
if there was error, the College was "substantially prejudiced" by 
the action of the ALJ, or whether such error was harmless. Utah 
Code Ann. Section 63-46b-4. Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS 
Kirby has set forth in the body of his Brief the relevant 
statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Kirby concurs in the College's Statement of the Case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kirby does not agree with many of the so-called "facts" 
set forth by the College. The Court is not considering the merits 
of this action, but only the timeliness of Appellant's Request. 
Nevertheless, the College has inserted "facts" not relevant to the 
matters on appeal in order to attempt to convince the Court that 
a terrible miscarriage of justice will occur if it does not find 
a way to permit the College to wiggle out of its obligations under 
the Commission's Order. 
Kirby agrees that this is a case of reverse discrimination. 
Kirby had been employed by the College on a part-time, adjunct 
basis, teaching Spanish. When a full-time, permanent faculty 
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position was advertised, he applied for the job. He was fully 
qualified. The position was awarded to a Hispanic woman, who did 
not possess the minimum qualifications for the position. 
Kirby filed a claim with the UADD, stating he was a victim of 
sex, race and religious discrimination and retaliation. After a 
through investigation, the UADD issued a Determination and Order 
finding that he had suffered sexual and racial discrimination on 
January 22, 1993. The College did not request an extension of time 
to request an evidentiary hearing. The College did not request a 
review of that Determination and Order until February 23, 1993, one 
day after the statutory thirty-day period had run. The ALJ denied 
the College's Request because it was untimely. Thereafter, the 
College filed two timely motions for review with the Industrial 
Commission, both of which were denied. It then filed a timely 
notice of appeal. 
However, the College has misled the Court in several areas in 
its Statement of Facts. The College claims that Kirby was ranked 
eleventh among the applicants for the faculty position in Spanish. 
It doesn't mention that all the ranking sheets, which the College 
is required by affirmation action regulations to maintain, have 
disappeared. Therefore, there is no factual basis for this 
ranking. 
The College claims that the sole reason why it found for Kirby 
was that the successful applicant had not completed her masters 
degree by July 1992. In fact, the Industrial Commission 
articulated three reasons for its Determination. 
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The College had set forth three qualifications for the faculty 
position in Spanish, to wit: 
1. M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field. 
2. Teaching experience, with preference to those with 
demonstrated strength in community college teaching. 
3. Non-teaching related work experience. Addendum G to 
Appellants Brief, R.76. 
It is undisputed that the successful applicant, Laura Gaona-
Bradford, had not received her masters degree before she was 
selected for the position. Although the College claims she 
received that degree by September 1992, and suggests there is proof 
of that fact on the record, it is untrue. There is no proof that 
she had received that degree by the time her employment began in 
September 1992. The fact is, she did not receive the degree in or 
before September 1992. 
Further, the College states that the sole basis for the 
Determination of discrimination was an assumption (which it claims 
was inaccurate) that the successful applicant had to have a masters 
degree by July 1992. In fact, the Determination states that Kirby 
was the more qualified candidate for numerous reasons. First, he 
had already obtained a masters degree, while Ms. Gaona-Bradford had 
not. Further, Kirby had demonstrated strength in community college 
teaching, while Ms. Gaona-Bradford had no community college 
teaching experience at all. Finally, the Industrial Commission 
found Kirby had more college level teaching experience, and more 
general work experience than Ms. Gaona-Bradford. The merits of 
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Kirby's claim are far stronger than the College would have the 
Court believe. 
The most serious misstatement of fact the College made 
concerns the position the ALJ took in his Order denying the 
College's Motion for Review. The College stated 
The Commission concluded that the general UAPA provision 
allowing for an extension of time periods for good cause, 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993), did not 
apply to UADD proceedings and thus, no extension of time 
for requesting a formal evidentiary hearing was available 
to the College for "good cause." Appellant's Brief at 
6, citing to R. 615. 
In fact, the ALJ specifically found that Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-46b-l(9) did apply, and did not accept Kirby's argument 
that it should not apply in this case. Addendum E to Appellant's 
Brief, R. 615. However, the ALJ found that 
The Respondent failed to timely request an extension of 
time in which to file, or timely file its motion for 
review. Addendum E to Appellant's Brief, R. 616, 
emphasis added. 
With the exception of these corrections, Kirby accepts the 
College's Statement of Facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because the College did not request an extension of time 
within which to file its Request for Review before the thirty day 
period established in both Utah Code Ann. Sections 34-35-7.1(5)(c) 
and 63-46b-12, and in Utah Administrative Code R560-1-4A(3) , the 
Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to extend the time 
to file a Request, even if there were "good cause" to do so. 
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However, even assuming the Industrial Commission had 
jurisdiction after thirty days to extend the thirty-day period, 
the College failed to request such an extension. 
Assuming that the College's Respond to Complainant's Motion 
to Strike and the Affidavit of J. Clark Whitehead, attached thereto 
as Addenda 1 and 2, filed March 11, 1993, after the ALJ's Order of 
Dismissal was filed, were sufficient to request an extension of the 
thirty-day period and were timely, the ALJ did not abuse his 
discretion in denying the extension of time. As a matter of fact 
and law, the excuse set forth by the College, to wit: that the 
internal procedure for filing a request could not be completed by 
closing time on February 22, 1992, is not "good cause." 
With respect to the issue of the College's lack of opportunity 
to respond to Kirby's Motion to Strike its Request for lack of 
timeliness, the ALJ made no error in failing to wait for the 
College's response. There is no evidence on the record that the ALJ 
even considered Kirby's Motion. The ALJ made its decision based 
solely on the lack of timeliness of the Request from the College. 
However, even if it were error for the ALJ to rule before the 
College had an opportunity to reply to Kirby's Motion, that error 
was harmless. The Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction after 
the thirty days had passed to rule on the merits of the case. 
Further, the arguments set forth in the College's Response were 
inadequate to justify such an extension. Finally, those same 
arguments were submitted by the College in its Motion for Review 
and its Motion for Reconsideration, and were rejected twice by the 
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ALT. There is no reason to believe they would have been accepted 
the first time around, had they been considered. 
ARGUMENT 
I. KIRBY INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE THE RESPONSE OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO THE COLLEGE'S ARGUMENTS SET FORTH IN 
POINT I OF THE BRIEF SUBMITTED BY THE COLLEGE. 
II. AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE OF THE COLLEGE TO SEEK AN 
EXTENSION OF THE THIRTY-DAY TIME PERIOD FOR FILING A REQUEST 
FOR REVIEW BEFORE THAT PERIOD RAN, THE DETERMINATION AND ORDER 
OF THE COMMISSION IS A FINAL ORDER. 
The College claims that the Commission, through the ALJ, 
determined that the "good cause" extension period in Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-46b-l(9) does not apply to the cases decided by the 
UADD. In fact, the ALJ specifically found that Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-46b-l(9) did apply. That statute provides that, 
"nothing restricts a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from 
lengthening...any time period prescribed in this chapter, except 
those time periods prescribed for judicial review." (Emphasis 
added.) 
What the Industrial Commission actually determined in this 
case is that it was without jurisdiction to proceed, once the 
thirty-day period within which a Request must be filed had passed. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 34-35-7.1(5)(c) and Administrative Rule 
R560-1-4(A) (2) and (3) all provide that unless the Request is filed 
within thirty days of the issuance of the Determination and Order, 
that Order is final. Once the Order is final, there are no further 
rights of review or appeal within the Commission. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 34-35-7.1(5)(d). 
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The College cites Maverick Country Stores, Inc. v, Industrial 
Commission, supra in support of its claim that the extension of 
time is available to it. Kirby does not dispute the finding in 
that case that a "good cause" extension is potentially available 
to an employer who wishes to have an evidentiary hearing on the 
Industrial Commission's initial Determination and Order. However, 
the Court in Maverick held that 
..., absent a showing of good cause for an extension, 
the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12 requires, 
as a prerequisite to the agency taking jurisdiction over 
a review, actual delivery of the necessary documents to 
the agency within the thirty day time limit. (Maverick 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, supra at 
950. (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, it is undisputed that the College failed to 
deliver either a Request for Review or for an extension of time 
until after the thirty-day deadline. Therefore, the Industrial 
Commission had no jurisdiction to consider the review. 
The College claims it requested an extension of time within 
which to file its Request for Review in its Response to Kirby's 
Motion to Strike. However, that Response was not filed until 
several weeks after the thirty-day deadline to seek an evidentiary 
hearing had passed. Indeed, the Industrial Commission had issued 
its Order of Dismissal, denying the Request of the College for a 
review on the grounds that the Request was untimely, before the 
College requested an extension. 
In fact, the College actually argued that the Industrial 
Commission abused its discretion in failing to grant it a one-day 
extension of time, without a timely request that it do so. This 
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is exactly the situation the Court faced in Maverick. There the 
employer failed to timely request an extension of the thirty-day 
period, and the Court found no abuse of discretion when the 
Industrial Commission failed to grant the extension. 
The College claims that Harper Investments, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 231 Utah Ad.Rep. 3 (Utah 1994) supports its 
position, in that the Utah Supreme Court implicitly rejected the 
Commission's view that it is deprived of jurisdiction once the 
thirty-day period has expired. Kirby concedes that the Tax 
Commission granted an extension of time to file a Motion to 
Reconsider after the time to file the Motion had passed. However, 
the Tax Commission had failed to send notice of its decision to the 
parties affected by its decision. More importantly, neither the 
Tax Commission nor appellants raised the issue of propriety of that 
extension, and therefore the matter was not before the Court. 
The College argues that Rule 4(e) and Rule 48(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure support its claim that a request for 
an extension of time may be filed after the original thirty-day 
time period. However, both of those rules explicitly provide that 
such an extension may be sought after the initial thirty-day 
period, so long as the request is made within thirty days of the 
date the original thirty-day deadline has run. There is no such 
extra time provided in Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9) to 
request an extension. 
The College argues that the Court should follow the standards 
established for Rules 4(e) and 48(e) of the Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure for "good cause" extensions of time. The College cited 
State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) in support of that 
position. However, that case held that, when a criminal Defendant 
is informed of a thirty-day time period within which to withdraw 
his guilty plea, and attempts to withdraw it after the thirty-day 
period, the withdrawal is untimely. The matter is jurisdictional. 
However unfair it may appear, the Court cannot permit the 
withdrawal. Only if the Defendant had requested an extension 
within thirty days after his initial thirty-day deadline expired 
would it have been possible for him to withdraw his plea. State 
v. Price, supra at 583. 
Similarly, in this case the College was informed in the 
initial Order of January 22, 1993, that it must file a written 
request for a formal hearing within thirty days from the issuance 
of the Order and told that if no timely request is received, the 
Order would become a final Order with no further rights of appeal. 
(R. 549-550.) 
However, Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9) does not provide 
for any grace period to request an extension. Therefore, the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 34-35-7.1(5) (d) govern, there 
being no relevant provision of the UAPA which would supercede the 
UADD statutory scheme. Utah Code Ann. Section 34-35-7.1(5)(d) 
provides 
If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, 
the determination and order issued by the director... 
becomes the final order of the commission. 
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Such final orders are subject only to judicial review. (Utah Code 
Ann. Section 63-46b-14.) 
III. EVEN ASSUMING THAT A REQUEST FOR EXTENSION IS VALID IF 
FILED AFTER THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD, THE COLLEGE FAILED TO FILE 
ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO DEMONSTRATE "GOOD CAUSE." 
Although the College claims on page 18 of its Brief that it 
requested a good cause extension of the thirty-day time period, 
there is no evidence of that request on the record. The only 
documents in the record in which the College asked for such an 
extension are the College's Response to Kirby's Motion to Strike 
and the Affidavit of J.Clark Whitehead, the Director of Personnel 
Services at the College. 
In the Response, the College stated 
In this case, the College policy requires an internal 
review of the response by the College administration 
before filing. The person in charge did everything in 
his power to expedite the review, but could not finalize 
that review because of circumstances beyond his control. 
(Addendum 1.) 
Mr. Whitehead stated essentially the same facts in his Affidavit. 
Even assuming that these statements in pleadings on another 
issue are sufficient to request an extension of time to file a 
Request for Review, and assuming that a request is timely if made 
after the Industrial Commission had dismissed the Request for 
Review because it was untimely, the request for an extension could 
not be granted. 
Kirby could find no cases which define "good cause" as used 
in Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9). However, as the College 
pointed out, the Rule 4(e) and 48(e) of the Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure are analogous to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46-1(9). The 
Courts have uniformly interpreted the time period in those rules 
to be jurisdictional, and a failure to timely appeal or request an 
extension renders the appellate courts without jurisdiction. See, 
for example, State v. Price, supra; State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521 
(Utah App. 1989); Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 
P.2d 952 (Utah 1984) . 
In interpreting the Appellate Rules, the Court refused to find 
"good cause" when a prisoner, who could not personally deliver an 
appeal to the trial court, mailed the notice of appeal from prison 
three days before the deadline, but the trial court did not receive 
the notice until over three weeks later. Although the Court in 
Prowswood was construing earlier Court rules, which provided for 
an "excusable neglect" standard, rather than "good cause", its 
findings and holding are instructive. It wrote 
When the question of "excusable neglect" arise in 
a jurisdictional context..., the standard contemplated 
thereby is necessarily a strict one. Prowswood, Inc. v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., supra at 959. 
It cited with approval an instance when a court refused to grant 
an extension of time when the senior litigator responsible for the 
case had died. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., supra 
at 960. 
Similarly, in this case, the fact that the College failed to 
complete its internal review of the response asking for an 
evidentiary hearing in a timely manner is hardly "good cause." 
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The Court in Prowswood particularly emphasized that the 
prejudice to the person seeking the extension of time has, and 
should have, no impact on the determination of whether or not 
excusable neglect existed. Id. Similarly, the prejudice to the 
College if it is bound by the Commission's Order is irrelevant to 
a determination of whether "good cause" existed to grant an 
extension of time. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-16(4), which governs this 
appeal, provides 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if,...it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced....(emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, supra at 586, held that the legislature intended the 
courts to use the same standard as "harmless error", which is error 
"sufficiently inconsequential that...there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affect the outcome of the proceedings." 
In this case, even if the College had made a timely request 
for an extension of time to file its Request for Review, it has 
not been substantially prejudiced by the AU's failure to consider 
its request for an extension of time. It has not set forth facts 
sufficient to demonstrate the "good cause" necessary to justify an 
extension of time to file the Request. 
IV. IF THE ALJ ERRED IN RULING BEFORE THE COLLEGE RESPONDED 
TO KIRBY'S MOTION TO STRIKE, THAT ERROR WAS UTTERLY HARMLESS. 
The College claims that somehow it was "substantially 
prejudiced" by the AU's ruling on the timeliness of its Request 
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for Review before it had responded to Kirby's Motion to Strike on 
the grounds that the Request for Review was untimely. 
There is nothing on the record that demonstrates that Kirby's 
Motion influenced the ALJ at all. He did not grant Kirby's Motion 
to Strike. Rather, he merely held that the College "failed to file 
its request for de novo review within 30 days of the date of the 
order." 
Further, for the reasons set forth above in Sections II and 
III of this Brief, the College's request for an extension of time 
was itself untimely, or insufficient. Therefore, the failure of 
the ALJ to consider the College's arguments in its Response to 
Kirby's Motion to Strike are utterly harmless. The ALJ could have 
made no other decision than that the Request was untimely. 
Finally, the College made precisely the same arguments in its 
Motion for Review of the Order of Dismissal and its Motion for 
Reconsideration as those set forth in its Response. They were 
rejected twice. There is absolutely no reason to assume that they 
would have been more persuasive before the ALJ ruled that the 
Request for Review was denied because it was untimely. 
In fact, if Kirby had not filed his Motion, pointing out that 
the Request for Review was untimely, the College would not have 
realized its mistake until after its Request had been denied. It 
is clear that the College believed that the filing deadline had 
been met. The College was not harmed by the timing of the decision 
of the ALJ to deny its Request for an evidentiary hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of April, 1994. 
Lou; 
Attorney for PauS T. Kirby 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies gf the^bove 
and foregoing was hand-delivered on the / *vf- day of, 
1994, to the following: 
Alan Hennebold 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L.A. Dever 
Deputy Solicitor General 
2 36 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM 1 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (2140) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3220 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
PAUL S. KIRBY, 
Complainant, 
-v-
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondent. 
RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE RESPONSE OF 
RESPONDENT, OR TO DENY REQUEST 
FOR HEARING 
UADD No, 
EEOC No., 
92-0590 
35C-92-611 
Respondent Salt Lake Community College (hereinafter 
College) through its counsel John S. McAllister, Assistant 
Attorney General, hereby responds to the Complainant Paul S. 
Kirby's Motion to Strike Response of Respondent, or to Deny 
Request for Hearing, dated March 5, 1993, and received March 8, 
1993. 
As a basis for his motion Complainant argues that (1) 
the College's response is untimely and (2) that the College has 
not alleged additional evidence ("new facts") or given cause for 
the evidence to be viewed differently. 
Complainant's motion should be denied and the College's 
response and request for a hearing should be allowed for the 
following reasons: 
1. The original Order dated January 22, 1993, was 
served by mail and was received on January 26, 1993, which 
shortened the 30 day response period. In fairness, Respondent 
should have the full 30 day period to respond and request a 
hearing. 
2. The 30 day period from January 22, 199 3, ended on 
Sunday, February 21, 1993. The next available day for filing was 
Monday, February 22, 1993. The College's response was hand 
delivered on Tuesday February 23, 199 3, to the Director and the 
original investigator. If the response can be considered late at 
all, it was only late by one day. 
3. The Director may lengthen the time period for 
filing a request for review, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9). In 
this case the College policy requires an internal review of a 
response by the College administration before filing. The person 
in charge did everything within his power to expedite the review, 
but could not finalize that review because of circumstances 
beyond his control. The Director in fairness should lengthen the 
time allowed to accept the College's request. 
4. The Director was notified verbally during the time 
period that the College intended to request a hearing. 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy o 
the foregoing Response to Complainant's Motion to Strike Respons 
of Respondent, or to Deny Request for Hearing, postage prepaid, 
to the following on this the /rp- day of March, 1993: 
Louise T. Knauer 
Attorney for Complainant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carlos Jimenez 
Director of Diversity 
Salt Lake Community College 
P.O. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
-5-
ADDENDUM 2 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (2140) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3220 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
PAUL S. KIRBY, : 
Charging Party, :AFFIDAVIT OF J- CLARK WHITEHEAD 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, UADD No, 92-0590 
Respondent. EEOC No. 35C-92-0611 
J. Clark Whitehead having been duly sworn, hereby 
states: 
1. I am the Director of Personnel Services at Salt 
Lake Community College. 
2. I have the duty of handling employee relation 
matters at the College and provide back-up support to the 
College's Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity who handles 
discrimination complaints. 
3. I received a copy of the initial complaint in the 
Paul Kirby matter from the Utah Anti-discrimination Division 
(UADD). The copy was handed to me by the Director of Diversity 
and Equal Opportunity. 
4. The Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity 
kept me informed of matters surrounding the complaint and 
investigation. 
5. The Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity 
proceeded to cooperate and conduct a thorough investigation of 
this case, and duly reported it to UADD. 
6. The UADD investigator issued a determination of 
reasonable cause resulting in an order dated January 22, 1993. 
7. The order stated that an appeal and request for a 
formal hearing must be filed within 30 days from the order, or 
February 21, which was a Sunday and UADD offices are not open for 
filing. 
8. During the thirty days, the Director of Diversity 
and Equal Opportunity had indicated verbally to the Director of 
UADD intentions to file a request for a hearing. 
9. In fact a request was filed at the UADD office on 
February 23, 1993. 
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10. The reason the request was not filed on February 
22, 1993, was that the College has an internal procedure for 
reviewing and approving the appeal. 
11. The procedure could not be completed for filing 
the request by closing time on February 22, 1993, a situation 
unavoidable and beyond the control of the Director of Diversity 
and Equal Opportunity. 
12. The initial UADD investigation was not complete 
and there is further information which calls into question the 
UADD investigator's initial finding of a prima facia case. 
13. The UADD investigator relied on information that 
the person selected for the position was required to obtain but 
did not have a Master's degree. 
14. Based solely on the finding of the absence of a 
Master's degree, the investigator concluded that the College 
selection was discriminatory and made because of race and sex. 
15. The correct information is that the College policy 
and practice allows a person to be selected if that person is at 
the completion stage of a degree. 
16. The person selected was working toward a Master's 
degree and completed the requirements as soon as possible in the 
fall of 1992 as required and as advertised. 
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17. Further, the investigator overlooked a complex 
higher education selection procedure which considered a field ot 
over 25 applicants and ranked the person selected higher in both 
the screening and interview portions of the selection. 
18. The Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity 
concluded from his investigation that the selection was based on 
the relative merits of the applicants pursuant to the regular 
College selection process, and not because of any illegal 
discrimination. I concurred in his conclusion. 
19. This additional information should have been 
considered by the investigator, and it was not. The decision of 
the Director likely would have been different had the information 
been placed before the Director before the decision was made. 
20. The investigator never did find any discriminatory 
practice or incident, but rather presumed discrimination from the 
sole fact that the person selected did not have the required 
Master's degree. 
21. Because the person selected did in fact obtain the 
required Master's degree according to College requirements, there 
appears to be no reasonable basis for a presumption of 
discrimination. These facts deserve to be further heard, and if 
the facts are not heard the College will be unduly and severely 
prejudiced. 
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I verify that the foregoing statement is true to the 
best of my information and belief. 
Dated this %^ day of April, 1993. 
Q /l&sJ l/)J^AJJ 
1993.^ 
J. CLARK WHITEHEAD 
S ^ ^ r r i h ^ * n H awr™ t o before me t h i s ffid/^ 
NOTARY PUFMC | , ^ 
JOYCE COTTRELL : / 
4600 South fUdwood Road 
of A p r i l , 
-i 4 A\& )%} Salt Uke City, UT 8 
v > ^ > # / August 15.1 
, i 8 .»** ,r , # 
84130-C90B 
Expires 
1995 
STATE OF UTAH ©tfBOfif PUBLIC/
7
 , z? , 
R e s i d i n g rO 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING 
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing 
Affidavit of J. Clark Whitehead was hand delivered by me 
personally to the Utah Anti-discrimination Division Office on the 
& day of April, 1993-
LISTER 
ssistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
Salt Lake Community College 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING , 
j. in I hereby certify that on this O day of 
__, 1993, I mailed an accurate photocopy of the 
foregoing Affidavit of J. Clark Whitehead to the following 
address: 
Louise T. Knauer 
Attorney for Complainant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carlos A. Jimenez 
Director of Diversity and Equal 
Opportunity 
Salt Lake Community College 
P-0. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
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